Nigeria
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices  - 2003
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
February 25, 2004
Nigeria is a federal republic composed of 36 states and a capital 
territory, with an elected president and a bicameral legislature 
drawing their authority from the 1999 constitution. In April, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was 
reelected to a 4-year term after being declared winner in elections 
that international and domestic observers stated were marred by 
serious irregularities and fraud, including political violence. At 
year's end, opposition parties continued to challenge the election in 
court. The elections also resulted in the ruling PDP winning 70 
percent of the seats in the national legislature and 75 percent of 
the state governorships. Although the judicial branch remained 
susceptible to executive and legislative branch pressures, the 
performance of the Supreme Court and decisions at the federal 
appellate level were indicative of growing independence. State and 
local judiciary were significantly influenced by political leaders 
and suffered from corruption and inefficiency more than the federal 
court system.
The Federal Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is tasked with law enforcement 
and the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) officially reported 
directly to the President. Internal security is the duty of the State 
Security Service (SSS), which reports to the President through the 
National Security Advisor. Police were unable to control ethno-
religious violence on numerous occasions during the year, and the 
Government continued its reliance on the army in those cases. While 
civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the 
security forces, there were some instances in which elements of the 
security forces acted outside the law. Security forces committed 
several serious human rights abuses.
The country's market-based economy grew 3.3 percent in real terms in 
2002, and most credible estimates project a slight decline to 3.2 
percent growth during the year. Inadequate infrastructure, endemic 
corruption, and general economic mismanagement hindered economic 
growth. Most of the population of approximately 130 million were 
rural and engaged in small-scale agriculture, which accounted for 
only 42 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Increased 
unemployment was a problem. Much of the country's wealth remained 
concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Corruption, 
nontransparent government contracting practices, and other systems 
favored the wealthy and politically influential, including: A banking 
system that impeded small and medium investor access to credit; and 
regulatory and tax regimes that were not always enforced impartially. 
Wages and benefits have not kept pace with inflation. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that 91 million 
citizens lived below the poverty line and were subject to 
malnutrition and disease. 
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the 
Government continued to commit serious abuses. Elections held during 
the year were not generally judged free and fair and therefore 
abridged citizens' right to change their government. Security forces 
committed extrajudicial killings and used excessive force to 
apprehend criminal suspects, and to quell some protests. There were 
several politically-motivated killings by unknown persons during the 
year. Security forces regularly beat protesters, criminal suspects, 
detainees, and convicted prisoners; however, there were fewer 
reported incidents of torture by security agents than in previous 
years. Impunity was a problem. Shari'a courts sentenced persons to 
harsh punishments including amputations and death by stoning; 
however, no amputation or stoning sentences were carried out, and one 
of the judgments was dismissed on appeal during the year. Prison 
conditions were harsh and life threatening, and conditions 
contributed to the death of numerous inmates. Security forces 
continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, including for 
political reasons. Prolonged pretrial detention remained a serious 
problem. The judicial system often was incapable of providing 
criminal suspects with speedy and fair trials. Government authorities 
occasionally infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government at 
times limited freedom of speech and press. The Government continued 
placing limits on freedom of assembly and association, citing 
security concerns. Some state governments placed limits on some 
religious rights, and some government programs discriminated between 
religious groups. The Government occasionally restricted freedom of 
movement for security reasons in areas of unrest and used lethal 
force at checkpoints. Domestic violence and discrimination against 
women remained widespread. Female genital mutilation (FGM) remained 
widely practiced in some parts of the country, and child abuse and 
child prostitution were common. Intercommunal violence remained a 
problem. Some militant members of the Ijaw ethnic group in the oil-
producing Niger Delta region continued to commit serious abuses, 
including unlawful killings and kidnappings, leading to violent 
reprisal attacks by the Itsekiri ethnic group. Ethnic and regional 
discrimination remained widespread, and localized discrimination and 
violence against religious minorities persisted. Some restrictions on 
worker rights continued. Some persons, including children, were 
subjected to forced labor. Child labor continued to increase. 
Trafficking in persons for purposes of prostitution and forced labor 
was a problem, and collusion of government officials in trafficking 
was alleged. Vigilante violence continued throughout the country, 
particularly in parts of the South.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life There were no political 
killings by security forces; however, national police, army, and 
security forces committed extrajudicial killings or used excessive 
force to apprehend criminals and to disperse protestors during the 
year, when crowds were perceived by police as possibly becoming 
violent. Multinational oil companies and domestic oil producing 
companies subcontracted police and soldiers from area units 
particularly to protect the oil facilities in the volatile Niger 
Delta region. Freelance security forces and former security forces 
accounted for a portion of the violent crime committed during the 
year. Police were instructed to use lethal force against suspected 
criminals and suspected vandals near oil pipelines in the Niger Delta 
Region. 
The Federal anticrime taskforce, also known as "Operation Fire for 
Fire," was among the most frequent human rights offenders. Operation 
Fire for Fire was established in response to widespread public calls 
for the Government and police to address violent crime more 
vigorously. Police and anticrime taskforce personnel involved 
committed extrajudicial killings in the apprehension and detention of 
suspected criminals, and were instructed to use deadly force to 
subdue violent criminals. According to Inspector General of Police 
Tafa Balogun, from March 2002 until November, police killed more than 
1,200 criminals and arrested more than 2,800. There were widespread 
complaints that Operation Fire for Fire has given a largely untrained 
police force broad latitude in using deadly force. In most cases, 
police officers were not held accountable for excessive or deadly 
force, or for the deaths of persons in custody. They generally 
operated with impunity in the apprehension, illegal detention, and 
sometimes execution of criminal suspects (see Section 1.d.). 
During the year, police, military, and anticrime personnel continued 
to regularly use lethal force against suspected criminals. For 
example, on May 2, a police officer reportedly opened fire on a 
commercial bus in Ado Ekiti, mistakenly killing two students, while 
searching for a fugitive. The policeman was arrested and detained but 
had not been formally charged at year's end. On August 4, police 
reportedly killed three robbery suspects in Enugu State. The 
policemen alleged that the suspects were robbing passengers in a bus 
when they were caught. The policemen have not been arrested or 
detained for the killings. On August 12, a police officer shot three 
suspects, accused of killing a police officer, while the suspects 
were in a jail in Kubwa. Police were investigating the shooting at 
year's end. 
On September 8, the Bauchi State Police Command reported that police 
killed nine suspected armed robbers in various parts of the state: 
Four were killed in two separate shoot-outs, while the remaining five 
were killed while in custody in a police van to prevent their escape. 
The policeman accused of the 2002 shooting of Ikenna Asikaburu, an 18-
year-old student in Lagos, was dismissed from the force, but no 
compensation has yet been paid to the family. 
Criminal suspects died from unnatural causes while in official 
custody, usually as the result of neglect and harsh treatment (see 
Section 1.c.). On May 12, a police sergeant allegedly tortured to 
death Haruna Mohammed while he was in custody in Bauchi. Mohammed was 
being held on suspicion of stealing $75 (10,000 naira) from the 
Speaker of the State House of Assembly. The Bauchi House of Assembly 
formally petitioned the state police commissioner for an 
investigation. There were no further developments by year's end. 
There were only a few cases in which members of the police were held 
accountable for abuses. Harsh and life-threatening prison conditions 
and denial of proper medical treatment also contributed to the deaths 
of numerous inmates. 
Security forces committed other unlawful killings during the year. 
Due to the large number of civilian deaths by police, armed police in 
public arguments often found themselves in the middle of large crowds 
that occasionally took revenge. In many cases, police accidentally 
killed persons while attempting to disperse crowds. For example, on 
January 24, a gin seller called police to assist in collecting a 
debt. In the ensuing argument, a policeman shot and killed the 
debtor's pregnant wife. The officer was taken into custody and was 
awaiting trial at year's end. 
On May 14, in Edo State, a policeman argued with a commercial 
motorcycle rider, and a crowd formed. The policeman attempted to 
disperse the crowd by firing into the air, but killed two persons. An 
investigation was pending at year's end. Violence and lethal force at 
police and military roadblocks and checkpoints continued during the 
year. For example, on May 19, police shot an Ebonyi State Medical 
student at a checkpoint after being arrested for refusing to pay a 
$0.08 (10 naira) bribe. The policeman was arrested. 
On June 25, a policeman shot and killed the driver of a commercial 
bus in Jigawa State, after the driver refused to pay a $0.15 (20 
naira) bribe. Police were investigating the shooting at year's end. 
On September 8, soldiers shot a motorcycle operator who refused to 
pay a $0.15 (20 naira) bribe at a checkpoint in Delta State. The 
Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) reported that 
military officials originally tried to claim that the individual was 
an armed robber to cover-up the incident. The Nigerian Bar 
Association called upon the Chief of Army staff to financially 
compensate the family of the deceased and discipline and prosecute 
the responsible soldiers. One soldier was transferred. Police and 
military personnel used excessive force and sometimes deadly force in 
the suppression of civil unrest, property vandalization, and 
interethnic violence, primarily in the oil and gas areas of the 
States of the Niger Delta and in Plateau State (see Sections 2.b., 5, 
and 6.b.). Although less frequent than in previous years, there were 
reported occurrences of summary executions, assaults, and other 
abuses carried out by military personnel and paramilitary mobile 
police across the Niger Delta. The Ondo State government had not 
released its report into the 2002 killing of four women on oil 
production platforms by year's end.
In mid-August, the Government began "Operation Restore Hope," a joint 
task force comprised of approximately 5,000 army, naval, air force, 
and mobile police personnel under the command of Army General Zamani, 
in response to violence in the Niger Delta region (see Section 5). 
Military personnel and youths have had repeated small-scale 
skirmishes, with total estimated casualties on both sides reaching 
1,000 for the year. Many human rights organizations have accused the 
military and police of harassment, extortion, and excessive use of 
force during Operation Restore Hope. In response to public pressure 
or formal requests from state governments, the Federal Government 
continued to deploy the army in troubled areas during the year. In 
September, after 2 years, the Government withdrew military forces 
from Plateau State. During the elections, the military was deployed, 
along with paramilitary and police, to maintain order in population 
centers throughout the country. There were reports that soldiers from 
some units committed serious abuses while performing this policing 
role, although the number of such incidents decreased from the 
previous year. The Benue Commission established in 2002 to 
investigate the October 2001 killing of approximately 200 civilians, 
rape, extortion, and looting in Benue State by soldiers had not 
published its report and findings by year's end. 
No action was taken against security forces in the following 2002 
cases: The January killing of 3 persons in Bayelsa State; the 
February killing of 15 youths in Delta State; the March killing of up 
to 25 persons in Katsina State; the April killing of Flight Sergeant 
Augustine Ogbolu in Ondo State; the May killing of University of 
Lagos students Gbenga Akinmogan and Shakirat Owolabi; the June 
killing of Agene Akinrinde in Lagos; the June killing of Oluwatosin 
Adelugba at a Lagos checkpoint; the August killing of John Osazuwa in 
Edo State; and the October Joint Security Taskforce killing of 6 
civilians during a communal clash in Plateau State. 
No action was taken against security forces in the reported 2001 
cases. On February 24, the Federal High Court ruled that Mohammed 
Abacha, former President General Sani Abacha's son, could be arrested 
and tried for the 1996 attempted murders of Abraham Adesanya, leader 
of Afenifere, and Alex Ibru, publisher of the Guardian newspaper. 
Abacha was confined to the city of Kano at year's end. 
There were several killings by unknown persons that may have been 
politically motivated. For example, on February 22, unknown persons 
shot and killed Uche Ogbonnaya, an opposition All Nigerian Peoples 
Party (ANPP) Senatorial candidate in Imo state, in his home in 
Owerri. On March 5, unknown persons killed Marshall Harry, a National 
Vice Chairman of the ANPP who formerly was a prominent member of the 
ruling PDP. Shortly before his death, Harry alleged that Rivers State 
Governor Peter Odili's men were intimidating political opponents and 
called on police to protect his party members from these "political 
thugs." Although some arrests were made in connection with the 
killings, no one was formally charged. Harry's daughter, an 
eyewitness to the killings, publicly stated that the persons arrested 
were not the perpetrators. There were no known developments in the 
following 2002 cases of politically motivated killings by unknown 
assailants: the June killing of magistrate Maria Theresa Nsa in Cross 
River State; the August killing of Victor Nwankwo in Enugu State; the 
October killing of gubernatorial candidate Dele Arojo; and the 
October killing of Professor Chimere Ikokwu in Enugu State. In 
October 2002, 11 of 27 suspects were charged with the murder of 
Justice Minister Bola Ige. The trial of 6 of the 11, including 
Senator Iyiola Omisore, who was elected in Osun State while in 
detention, started in March at an Ibadan high Court. The trial 
started and stopped several times, and two judges resigned due to 
pressure and threats. The remaining five persons charged were still 
in detention pending the start of their trial at year's end.Killings 
carried out by organized gangs of armed robbers remained common 
during the year. In most southeastern states, state governments 
supported vigilante groups, the most well-known of which was 
the "Bakassi Boys," officially known as the Anambra State Vigilante 
Service. Like most vigilante groups, the Bakassi Boys killed 
suspected criminals rather than turn them over to police. The 
influence of the Bakassi Boys diminished during the year. 
Other organized vigilante groups in large cities, particularly Lagos 
and Kano, continued to commit numerous killings of suspected 
criminals. These vigilante groups engaged in lengthy and well-
organized attempts to apprehend criminals after the commission of the 
alleged offenses. For example, on February 16, a vigilante group in 
Kano along with police killed three suspected robbers in a shoot-out. 
On October 30, the Akwa Ibom State Police Command officially 
authorized the formation of vigilante groups by local communities for 
the purpose of hunting down armed bandits.
No action was taken against members of vigilante groups who killed or 
injured persons during the year or in previous years, although police 
reportedly harassed members of such groups. Unlike in previous years, 
there were no reports of "torture chambers" operated by the Bakassi 
Boys. Reports of street mobs apprehending and killing suspected 
criminals diminished during the year, and there were no developments 
in cases from previous years. The practice of "necklacing" criminals 
(placing a gasoline-soaked tire around a victim's neck or torso and 
then igniting it, burning the victim to death) also declined. 
Politically-related violence occurred throughout the country from 
January through May. For example, on February 16, a clash between 
ANPP and PDP supporters in Benue State left seven persons dead. 
During the May 3 state elections in Delta State, eight persons were 
killed at the polls: five in Burutu, two in Ozoro, and one in Oleh. 
There were no developments in the following 2002 cases: the June 
killing of 2 persons in Delta State during a local PDP caucus; the 
July killing of 4 to 8 persons in primary-related violence in Bayelsa 
State; the unconfirmed killing of 50 persons in Bayelsa State in 
violence between two rival gangs; and the August killing of the Kwara 
PDP chairman. 
The trial for the September 2002 murder of Barnabas Igwe, Chairman of 
the Anambra State branch of the Nigerian Bar Association, and his 
wife did not begin by year's end. 
Lethal interethnic, intraethnic, and interreligious violence occurred 
at diminished levels from previous years (see Section 5). Sporadic 
communal violence continued between Tivs, Jukuns, and other tribes in 
Adamawa, Kogi, Edo, Delta, Nassarawa, and Plateau States during the 
year, killing hundreds of persons. 
During the year, rivalry and fighting between and among rival student 
affinity groups, commonly known as cults, in higher institutions led 
to the killing of persons and destruction of property. Cultism was on 
the rise, especially in the South and Middle Belt States, and seemed 
to coincide with the end of the 6-month national strike by university 
educators that kept most universities closed during the school year. 
For example, cultists killed a lecturer and four students at the 
University of Ilorin in Kwara State during the first 2 weeks of May. 
Between July 6 and July 8, eight students were killed at Ebonyi State 
University, just 2 weeks after it reopened, forcing the school to 
close indefinitely.There was no resolution in the 2002 cases 
involving deaths in cult clashes. 
b. Disappearance
There were reports of politically motivated disappearances during the 
year. 
On May 24, government security operatives detained one of the imams 
from the Kaduna Central Mosque for allegedly inciting violence in 
advance of President Obasanjo's May 29 inauguration. His supporters 
won a decision from the Kaduna High Court ordering the Government to 
produce him in court. The Government did not respond to the order, 
and the Imam remained at year's end missing, presumed to be in 
detention. 
On July 10, Mobile Police abducted Anambra State Governor Chris 
Ngige, forced his resignation, and held him for 5 hours. Ngige, a 
member of the ruling PDP, had allegedly pre-signed an undated 
resignation letter and had given it to Chris Uba, his political 
godfather. (A political godfather uses bribery and blackmail to help 
another person to obtain political office in exchange for receiving 
favors, usually contracts). Uba, with the aid of the Deputy Governor 
Okey Udeh and others, attempted to forcibly remove Ngige from office. 
On August 7, as prescribed by the 1999 Anambra State Constitution, a 
seven-member panel was convened to investigate allegations of "gross 
misconduct" by Udeh. On August 25, the Federal High Court ordered the 
panel to halt proceedings based on a motion filed by Udeh. The panel 
ignored the order and submitted its findings to the State House of 
Assembly. On September 9, the State House of Assembly voted to 
impeach Udeh. Udeh filed another suit with the Federal High Court 
claiming that his impeachment was unconstitutional, questioning the 
jurisdiction of the panel and State House of Assembly to move for his 
impeachment. On September 16, the Anambra State High Court issued an 
ex-parte order to terminate the previous Federal High Court order 
ceasing impeachment proceedings. On September 20, the Federal 
Government agreed to abide by the terms of the ex-parte order pending 
a ruling from a superior court. Legal proceedings were pending at the 
time of this report.
Members of ethnic groups in the oil-producing areas continued to 
kidnap foreign and local employees and contractors of oil companies, 
allegedly to press demands for increased redistribution of wealth 
generated by joint ventures with the state-controlled petroleum 
corporation. Most often the kidnappers simply demanded ransom likely 
to be used for personal gain, or to finance armed aggression between 
rival ethnic factions in the Niger Delta, particularly the Ijaw and 
Itsekiri. In all instances, the victims were released unharmed after 
negotiations between the captors and the oil firms or after the 
intervention of security forces. In previous years, the firms usually 
paid ransom and promised improved conditions; however, during the 
year, the major oil producers have refused ransom demands.Some 
kidnappings, particularly in the Delta, appear to have been part of 
longstanding ethnic disputes over resources. Due to limited manpower 
and resources, police and armed forces rarely were able to confront 
the perpetrators of these acts, especially in the volatile Delta 
region. For example, on January 14, unknown assailants kidnapped the 
Edo State ANPP Chairman from his office in Benin City and held him 
for 2 days. 
On January 28, unknown assailants kidnapped the traditional ruler of 
Aiyetoro Ota in Ogun State and held him for 3 weeks. 
On July 31, armed Ijaw youths kidnapped and later released a local 
Chevron worker outside of his home in Warri. Chevron reportedly 
refused to accede to ransom for any kidnapped employee, local or 
expatriate, at the request of the Government.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment
The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the law provides for 
punishment of such abuses; however, during the year, police, 
military, and security force officers regularly beat protesters, 
criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted prisoners. Police 
regularly physically mistreated civilians in attempts to extort money 
from them. The law prohibits the introduction into trials of evidence 
and confessions obtained through torture. In some cases, persons died 
from torture in custody (see Section 1.a.). 
Different formulations for criminal law of Islamic Shari'a were in 
place in 12 northern states (see Section 2.c.). Shari'a courts 
delivered "hudud" sentences such as amputation for theft, caning for 
fornication and public drunkenness, and death by stoning for 
adultery. No state prescribes hudud punishments for apostasy. Because 
no applicable case has been appealed to the federal level, federal 
appellate courts have yet to decide whether such punishments violate 
the Constitution (see Section 1.e.). Caning is also a punishment 
under common law in the Northern region Penal Code and has not been 
challenged in the courts as a violation of the Constitution. In some 
cases, convicted persons are allowed to choose to pay a fine or go to 
jail in place of receiving strokes of the cane. These sentences were 
usually carried out immediately, while all sentences involving 
mutilation or death allow 30 days for appeal. 
On October 1, a Shari'a court in Zamfara State sentenced Shafaiatu 
Tukur to 30 cane strokes and a $60 (8,000 naira) fine for arson. 
Tukur was given the option of a 5-year prison sentence instead. Her 
decision had not been announced by year's end.Stoning and amputation 
sentences have been overturned on procedural or evidentiary grounds, 
but not on constitutional grounds. For example, on September 25, the 
Katsina State Shari'a Court of Appeal overturned Amina Lawal's 
conviction of adultery on the grounds that she had not been allowed 
an appropriate defense by the lower court. No death sentences were 
carried out during the year. 
During the year, there were at least 44 cases in 5 states with 
sentences of stoning or amputation pending appeal or sentence 
implementation. No stoning or amputation sentences were carried out 
during the year.There was no update in the 2002 charge that 20 
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB) activists were detained unlawfully and tortured in Imo 
State.During the year, security forces beat persons. For example, on 
January 25, a suspected rapist briefly escaped custody in Ogun State. 
Four policemen in a neighboring compound caught the suspect and beat 
him severely. No investigation occurred by year's end. 
On December 8, after an attempted impeachment of the Speaker of the 
House, mobile policemen beat three state legislators in the Ekiti 
State Assembly while clearing the chambers to maintain order.
No investigation occurred in the 2002 beating of five commercial 
motorcycle operators in Lagos by police officers and soldiers, or in 
the 2002 alleged beating of 800 women trespassing on the grounds of 
the headquarters of Shell and Chevron-Texaco by security forces. 
Security forces beat journalists during the year (see Section 2.a.). 
On September 5, two policemen were arrested in Lagos for allegedly 
raping prostitutes they had arrested. Although there were numerous 
ethnic clashes during the year (see Section 5), the number of persons 
who were beaten or injured severely was lower than in previous years. 
The military was able to respond quickly, due largely to the fact 
that military units were already deployed in some areas when violence 
broke out. Police generally lacked the resources to control communal 
violence.
Hamza Al Mustapha, Muhammed Rabo Lawal, Colonel Yakubu, Ishaya 
Bamaiyi, and James Danbaba remained in detention under the secular 
criminal system as suspects in the attempted murder of Ibru. The 
trial slowly moved forward during the year, with five witnesses 
testifying for the prosecution and bail formally being denied for the 
suspects. Lateef Shofolahan, Mohammed Aminu, and Barnabas ("Rogers") 
Msheilia were released from detention during the year. Prison and 
detention conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Most 
prisons were built 70 to 80 years ago and lacked functioning basic 
facilities. Lack of potable water, inadequate sewage facilities, and 
severe overcrowding resulted in unhealthy and dangerous sanitary 
conditions. Some prisons held 200 to 300 percent more persons than 
their designed capacity. The Government acknowledged overcrowding as 
the main cause of the harsh conditions common in the prison system. 
The Comptroller-General of Prisons stated on September 23 that 40,447 
inmates were held in a system of 148 prisons and 83 satellite 
prisons, and he redesignated prisoner capacity, declaring the new 
capacity to be 44,556 prisoners. Some human rights groups estimated a 
higher number of inmates, perhaps as many as 60,000. Excessive 
pretrial detention contributed to the overcrowding (see Section 
1.d.).Disease was pervasive in the cramped, poorly ventilated 
facilities, and chronic shortages of medical supplies were reported. 
Prison inmates were allowed outside their cells for recreation or 
exercise only irregularly, and many inmates had to provide their own 
food. Only those with money or whose relatives brought food regularly 
had sufficient food; petty corruption among prison officials made it 
difficult for money provided for food to reach prisoners. Poor 
inmates often relied on handouts from others to survive. Beds or 
mattresses were not provided to many inmates, forcing them to sleep 
on concrete floors, often without a blanket. Prison officials, 
police, and security forces often denied inmates food and medical 
treatment as a form of punishment or to extort money from them. Harsh 
conditions and denial of proper medical treatment contributed to the 
deaths of numerous prisoners. According to the NGO Prisoners 
Rehabilitation and Welfare Action (PRAWA), dead inmates promptly were 
buried on the prison compounds, usually without notifying their 
families. A nationwide estimate of the number of inmates who die in 
the country's prisons was difficult to obtain because of poor record 
keeping by prison officials. PRAWA and other NGOs alleged that prison 
conditions were worse in rural areas than in urban districts. 
In January, 56 inmates in Lagos were placed in intensive care in 
Lagos prisons after a tuberculosis outbreak. There was no update on 
their condition by year's end. In practice, women and juveniles were 
held with male prisoners, especially in rural areas. The extent of 
abuse in these conditions was unknown. In most cases, women accused 
of minor offenses were released on bail; however, women accused of 
serious offenses were detained. Although the law stipulates children 
shall not be imprisoned, juvenile offenders were routinely 
incarcerated along with adult criminals. There was no formalized 
procedure regarding the separation of detainees and convicted 
prisoners, and the method of confinement depended solely on the 
capacity of the facility; as a result, detainees often were housed 
with convicted prisoners. The Ministry of Justice worked to create a 
judicial administration committee to address the questions of 
overcrowding, prison conditions, and rehabilitation. The NHRC also 
urged the Government and police not to detain persons in civil cases. 
The Government allowed international and domestic NGOs, including 
PRAWA and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
regular access to prisons. PRAWA and the ICRC published newsletters 
on their work. The Government admitted that there were problems with 
its incarceration and rehabilitation programs and worked with groups 
such as these to address those problems. Unlike in previous years, no 
NGOs reported problems with access to prisons. 
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile The Constitution prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces generally 
did not observe these prohibitions. Police and security forces 
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention. 
The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) is tasked with law enforcement, and 
the Inspector-General officially reported directly to the President. 
Each state unit was commanded by an Assistant Inspector General. The 
Constitution prohibits local and state police forces. The NPF 
continued its aggressive anti-crime campaign dubbed "Operation Fire 
for Fire," which was responsible for human rights abuses and did not 
noticeably decrease the incidents of violent crime nationwide (see 
Section 1.a.). Corruption was rampant, usually taking the form of 
bribes at highway checkpoints, and more than 250 police were arrested 
during the year and another 300 dismissed from service for 
corruption. In addition, more than 30 officers around the country 
were arrested in connection with armed robbery.
Police and security forces were empowered to make arrests without 
warrants based on a reasonable suspicion that a person had committed 
an offense; they often abused this power. Under the law, police may 
arrest and detain persons for 24 hours before charging them with an 
offense. The law requires an arresting officer to inform the accused 
of charges at the time of arrest and to take the accused to a police 
station for processing within a reasonable amount of time. By law, 
police must provide suspects with the opportunity to engage counsel 
and post bail. However, police generally did not adhere to these 
procedures. Suspects routinely were detained without being informed 
of the charges, denied access to counsel and family members, and 
denied the opportunity to post bail for bailable offenses. Detainees 
often were kept incommunicado for long periods of time. The provision 
for bail often was arbitrary or subject to extrajudicial influence. 
In many parts of the country, there was no functioning system of 
bail, so suspects were held in investigative detention for sustained 
periods of time. Numerous suspects alleged that police demanded 
payment before they were taken to court to have their cases heard. If 
family members attended court proceedings, police often demanded an 
additional payment. 
There were several politically-motivated arrests during the year. For 
example, in December 2002, police arrested Festus Keyamo, the leader 
of Movement for the Actualization of the Future Republic of the Niger 
Delta. Amnesty International reported that Keyamo was held 
incommunicado; denied medical assistance, adequate food, and clothes; 
and was likely detained for his political beliefs in seeking autonomy 
for the Niger Delta region. On February 3, police released Keyamo. 
On April 13, security agents arrested and detained James Bawa Magaji, 
an ANPP senatorial candidate, for 7 days for "protesting and 
reporting" the discovery of ballot boxes to the Kaduna Police 
Command. Magaji and ANPP supporters discovered that ballot boxes were 
kept in the warehouse of the state government instead of Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC). 
On April 19, security agents arrested UNPP Gubernatorial Candidate in 
Katsina State, Colonel Abdul Mummin Aminu, for electoral malpractices 
after Aminu reported to the police that ballot boxes had been taken 
to the home of the local government chairman instead of the INEC 
counting center. When diplomatic and international election observers 
arrived, the house containing the boxes was burned to the ground. 
Aminu was released four weeks later.
Security forces detained journalists on a few occasions during the 
year (see Section 2.a.). 
On September 11, security agents arrested Ali Rugange, a politician 
with the opposition ANPP, a photographer, and their driver for taking 
pictures in an attempted survey of personal properties belonging to 
the Vice President in Adamawa State. The two were not charged and 
Rugange filed suit for unlawful detention. Police stated the arrest 
was for "attempted mischief." A local court awarded Rugange $385 
(50,000 naira) to be paid by the police for wrongful arrest. 
During the year, police arrested labor leaders during strikes (see 
Section 6.b.). 
There were no updates in the following 2002 cases: the February suit 
against the Anambra State Police Commissioner alleging illegal arrest 
and detention filed by attorney Olusoga Omotayo; the June suit 
against five police officers and a traditional ruler in Enugu filed 
by Ibrahim Onuomada, a PDP youth leader; and the September raiding of 
MASSOB's headquarters by mobile policemen with alleged arrests of 
more than 1,000 members. Members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) 
continued to be arrested and detained without trial. Although 
relations with police were markedly improved and OPC operated freely, 
they reported that 30 to 50 members were placed in custody during the 
year. Others were charged as armed robbers and tried accordingly. 
Persons who happened to be in the vicinity of a crime when it was 
committed normally were held for interrogation for periods ranging 
from a few hours to several months. After their release, those 
detained frequently were asked to return repeatedly for further 
questioning. For example, on February 13, 17 persons were detained 
and on February 18, 14 more were detained in the investigation into 
the Idumagbo explosion in Lagos, in which 33 persons died. The 
persons detained were neighbors to the explosion site and employees 
of neighboring companies, and detentions lasted from 2 days to 
several weeks. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a serious problem. 
Serious backlogs, endemic corruption, and undue political influence 
continued to hamper the judicial system (see Section 1.e.). On 
September 23, the Controller-General of prisons stated that 25,380, 
approximately 63 percent, of prisoners were detainees awaiting trial 
who had not been charged; other sources placed the number as high as 
80 percent. Some had been waiting as long as 12 years, while many had 
approached the maximum length of their sentences. Multiple 
adjournments in some cases had led to serious delays. The NHRC urged 
the courts, the Ministry of Justice, and police to expedite cases 
awaiting trial. Police cited their inability to securely transport 
detainees to trial on their trial dates as one reason why so many 
were denied a trial. The NHRC reported that some detainees were held 
because their case files had been lost. Some state governments 
released inmates detained for significant periods of time without 
trial, including 100 inmates in Edo State and 17 inmates in Akwa 
Ibom, during the year. 
There were no developments in the 2002 suit filed by hundreds of 
inmates awaiting trial in Lagos challenging the constitutionality the 
criminal procedure invoked by magistrates to remand them to prison 
without standing trial. Most remained in detention at year's end. 
Ismaila Gwarzo, national security advisor to former President Abacha, 
remained restricted to his hometown in Kano State at year's end. 
The Constitution prohibits the expulsion of citizens, and the 
Government did not use forced exile. Many citizens who had lived 
abroad due to fear of persecution under previous military regimes 
continued to return to the country during the year. 
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial 
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the 
judicial branch remained susceptible to executive and legislative 
branch pressure. Decisions at the federal level were indicative of 
greater independence. The judiciary was influenced by political 
leaders particularly at the state and local levels. Understaffing, 
underfunding, inefficiency, and corruption continued to prevent the 
judiciary from functioning adequately. Citizens encountered long 
delays and frequent requests from judicial officials for small bribes 
to expedite cases. 
The Ministry of Justice implemented strict requirements for level of 
education and length of service for judges at the Federal and State 
level. However, there were no requirements or monitoring body for 
judges at the local level, and this led to significant corruption and 
miscarriages of justice. 
The recommendations of the 1993 Esho Panel, set up to investigate 
corruption in the judiciary, called for the "withdrawal" of 47 
judicial officials. No judges have been removed for irregularities 
cited in the Panel's report; however, Justice Usman Kusherki was 
removed on January 23 for his July 2002 aborting of the ANPP national 
convention. During the PDP convention the 21 PDP governors threatened 
to take their states' votes away from the president if he did not 
make certain concessions. For nearly 24 hours it appeared that the 
Vice President was thinking about breaking ranks and fighting against 
the president for the nomination. In the middle of the night, 
Obasanjo contacted this judge to get an order to stop the convention 
so that he would not have to give in to the governors to get his 
nomination. The judge refused and was dismissed within weeks, 
purportedly due to his actions regarding the ANPP convention 7 months 
earlier.
The regular court system is composed of federal and state trial 
courts, state appeals courts, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the 
Federal Supreme Court. There are Shari'a (Islamic) and customary 
(traditional) courts of appeal in states that use those bases for 
civil or criminal law, including in the Federal Capital Territory 
(Abuja). Courts of the first instance include magistrate or district 
courts, customary or traditional courts, Shari'a courts, and for some 
specified cases, the state high courts. The Constitution also 
provides that the Government establish a Federal Shari'a Court of 
Appeal and Final Court of Appeal; however, the Government had not yet 
established such courts by year's end. The nature of the case usually 
determined which court had jurisdiction. In principle, customary and 
Shari'a courts had jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant 
agree; however, in practice, fear of legal costs, delays, distance to 
alternative venues, and individual preference caused many litigants 
to choose the customary and Shari'a courts over other venues. In some 
states, cases involving only Muslims must be heard by a Shari'a 
court. Other states with Shari'a law still permitted Muslims to 
choose common law courts for criminal cases; however, societal 
pressure forced most Muslims to use the Shari'a court system. 
According to the Constitution, persons charged with offenses have the 
right to an expeditious trial. Criminal justice procedures call for 
trial within 3 months of arraignment for most categories of crimes; 
however, there were considerable delays, often stretching to several 
years, in bringing suspects to trial (see Section 1.d.). Most 
detainees were poor and could not afford to pay the costs associated 
with moving their trials forward, and as a result they remained in 
prison. Wealthier defendants employed numerous delay tactics and in 
many cases used financial inducements to persuade judges to grant 
numerous continuances. Such practices clogged the court calendar and 
prevented trials from starting. 
Trials in the regular court system were public and generally 
respected constitutionally protected individual rights in criminal 
cases, including a presumption of innocence, and the right to be 
present, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to be 
represented by legal counsel. However, there was a widespread 
perception that judges easily were bribed or "settled," and that 
litigants could not rely on the courts to render impartial judgments. 
Many courts were understaffed, and personnel were paid poorly. Judges 
frequently failed to appear for trials, often because they were 
pursuing other means of income. In addition, court officials often 
lacked the proper equipment, training, and motivation to perform 
their duties, again primarily due to inadequate compensation. 
In both common law and Shari'a courts, indigent persons without legal 
representation were more likely to have their sentences carried out 
immediately upon being sentenced, although all accused persons have 
the right to appeal. The Government instituted a panel of legal 
scholars to draft a uniform Shari'a criminal statute to replace 
divergent Shari'a statutes adopted by various northern states; 
however, states continued to apply their individual codes.There were 
no legal provisions barring women or other groups from testifying in 
civil court or giving their testimony less weight; however, the 
testimony of women and non-Muslims usually was accorded less weight 
in Shari'a courts. In violation of mainstream Shari'a jurisprudence, 
some Khadi judges subjected women to harsh sentences for fornication 
or adultery based solely upon the fact of pregnancy, while men were 
not convicted without eyewitnesses unless they confessed. There were 
no developments in the 2002 Human Rights Violations Investigation 
Panel (HRVIP) recommendations regarding the possible reversal of the 
Auta Tribunal's conviction Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni-9 in 1995. There 
were no reports of political prisoners. 
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence 
The Constitution prohibits such actions; however, authorities at 
times continued to infringe on these rights. 
Mobile police reportedly raided Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP) leader Ledum Mitee's residence, claiming they 
were searching for hidden weapons. A search of the residence did not 
yield any weapons. Mitee was not arrested. 
Police and security forces continued the practice of placing 
relatives and friends of wanted suspects in detention without 
criminal charge to induce suspects to surrender to arrest. Human 
rights groups called for police to end the practice. Purdah, the 
practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion from men outside the 
family, continued in parts of the country, which restricted the 
freedom of movement of women. 
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: 
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; 
however, the Government at times limited these rights. Some 
journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government owned and 
controlled most of the electronic media and some publications; 
however, there was also a large and vibrant private domestic press 
that frequently was critical of the Government. There were two 
national, government-owned daily newspapers in English, the New 
Nigerian and the Daily Times. The New Nigerian published an 
additional Hausa edition. Several states owned daily or weekly 
newspapers that also are published in English. They tended to be 
produced poorly, had limited circulation, and required large state 
subsidies to continue operating. By year's end, there were more than 
10 major daily newspapers, 5 weekly newsmagazines, and several 
sensational evening newspapers and tabloid publications. 
Because newspapers and television were relatively expensive and 
literacy levels were low, radio remained the most important medium of 
mass communication and information. There was a government-owned 
national radio broadcaster, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, 
which broadcast in English, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and other languages; 
51 state radio stations broadcast in English and local languages. The 
NBC, the body responsible for the deregulation and monitoring of the 
broadcast media did not license any new private radio stations during 
the year. There were eight private radio stations operating during 
the year.
The National Television Station, NTA, was federally owned, and 30 
states also operated television stations. There were nine privately 
owned television stations that broadcast domestic news and political 
commentary. There were two private satellite television services. The 
law requires that local television stations limit programming from 
other countries to 40 percent and restricted the foreign content of 
satellite broadcasting to 20 percent; however, the Government did not 
restrict access to, or reception of, international cable or satellite 
television. 
International broadcasting, principally Voice of America and British 
Broadcasting Corporation, as well as Deutsche Welle and others, 
broadcast in English and Hausa and were an important source of news 
in the country. During the year, two international broadcasting 
organizations reported that their accreditation renewals initially 
were denied but they later were allowed to reapply.
During the year, there were cases of threats against and attacks on 
the press. On August 22, police arrested The Source reporter, Lawson 
Heyford, after he reported on communal clashes in Rivers state. 
Police detained Heyford for 4 days and was reportedly interrogated 
about his naming alleged responsible parties. 
On August 30, police severely beat Daily Independent newspaper 
photographer, Akintunde Akinleye, on live television during the 
celebration of the Lagos traditional ruler's coronation. He regained 
consciousness and was released from the hospital one week later. Vice 
President Abubakar Atiku publicly apologized for the assault and paid 
compensation. In 2002, Zamfara State Government rescinded the fatwa 
death sentence issued by the Deputy Governor on Isioma Daniels, one 
of the journalists responsible for an article about the Miss World 
Pageant that sparked violence in Kaduna (see Section 2.c.). Several 
small Islamic groups announced forgiveness of the journalist during 
the year. 
There were no further known developments in the following 2002 cases: 
the February beating of a journalist by 10 policemen in Lagos or the 
arrest warrant for the Daily Times' managing director and editor for 
publishing negative stories about the Kogi State Governor. 
There were no further known developments in the reported 2001 
cases.Editors reported that government security officers sometimes 
visited or called to demand information about a story or source; 
however, journalists and editors no longer feared suspension or 
imprisonment for their editorial decisions. Local NGOs suggested that 
newspaper editors and owners underreported actual human rights abuses 
and killings due in part to self-censorship. State broadcasters and 
journalists remained important tools for governors; these officials 
used the state-owned media to showcase the state's accomplishments 
and to promote their own political goals.
On February 4, Senator Jonathan Zwingina announced that the Senate 
had repealed Decree 60 creating the Press Council, which was charged 
with the enforcement of professional ethics and the sanctioning of 
journalists who violated these ethics. However, on July 14, the House 
of Representatives announced new rules for journalists covering the 
National Assembly that requires all material to be cleared before 
publication. 
On June 30, security operatives bought hundreds of copies of TELL 
magazine in Abeokuta, Ogun State, in an attempt to limit the 
circulation of the magazine, which carried an article alleging 
corruption by the President and Vice President. 
On November 24, three editors from the weekly news magazine the 
Insider were arrested and charged on November 26 with sedition and 
criminal defamation in relation to an article published in the 
magazine alleging the involvement of government officials in 
questionable oil deals. The three were released on bail and the case 
adjourned until 2004. 
On December 28, the Deputy Governor of Kano State sued the Sun 
newspaper for libel. The paper alleged the deputy governor's 
involvement in a bribery scandal. Many journalists cited the libel 
laws as the main reason they practiced self-censorship. While private 
television and radio broadcasters remained economically viable on 
some advertising revenues and business interests of the owners', 
despite the restrictions that the Government imposed on them, 
government-sponsored broadcasting companies complained that 
government funding and advertising were inadequate for their 
needs.Foreign journalists who sought to enter the country to cover 
political developments generally have been able to obtain visas; 
however, they sometimes experienced multiple month-long delays, were 
issued only single entry visas, and forced to pay bribes to expedite 
visa processing. In March, the SSS briefly detained and harassed New 
York Times reporter Somini Sengupta and her two photographers in 
connection with reporting on clashes between Ijaw youths and the 
military near in Delta State. 
There were no developments in the 2002 government announcement that 
Time (International) magazine reporter Stephen Faris was subject to 
arrest for publishing a "false" report, which President Obasanjo's 
investigative panel concluded was intended to damage the nation's 
international image. 
The Government did not restrict Internet access, although unreliable 
and costly telephone service limited access and hindered service 
providers. Government-owned NITEL operated an Internet Source 
Provider (ISP) that competed with dozens of privately owned ISPs. The 
Government continued to restrict academic freedom by controlling 
curriculum at all levels including mandating religious instruction, 
and the quality of secondary education remained poor. Student groups 
alleged that numerous strikes, inadequate facilities, and the rise of 
cultism (or gangs) on campuses, particularly in the South, continued 
to hamper educational progress (see 
Section 1.a.). On several occasions during the year, police forces 
harassed and arrested students during protests (see Section 2.b.). 
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respected this right, although some limits remained. In areas that 
experienced communal violence, police and security forces permitted 
public meetings and demonstrations on a case-by-case basis.
The Government continued to nominally require organizers of outdoor 
public functions to apply for permits, although both government 
authorities and those assembling often ignored this requirement. 
The Government retained legal provisions banning gatherings whose 
political, ethnic, or religious content might lead to unrest. Open-
air religious services away from places of worship remained 
prohibited in many states due to fears that they might heighten inter-
religious tensions. The Ondo State ban on open-air religious events 
remained in effect during the year, and the Kaduna State government 
ban on processions, rallies, demonstrations, and meetings in public 
places still was being enforced on a case-by-case basis. A security 
forces committee ban on all political, cultural, and religious 
meetings in Plateau State continued to be implemented on an ad hoc 
basis. 
The Government denied the opposition ANPP permits to hold rallies for 
their presidential candidate on multiple occasions. In some cases, 
the Government allowed the rally within a few days of the originally 
requested date. On September 23, Governor Shekarau of Kano State 
authorized an ANPP rally in contravention of a denial from the 
Inspector General of Police. During the rally, police tear-gassed 
ANPP supporters. 
During the year, police killed 6 persons in Abuja, at least 10 
persons in Lagos, and 6 students in Port Harcourt when dispersing 
otherwise peaceful protests. 
On December 3, six members of the United Action for Democracy were 
arrested and beaten in Lagos when they attempted to hold a rally to 
protest the government's hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting. The activists filed suit on December 29 to 
protest both the detention and the beating.
Unlike in the previous year, police did not disrupt meetings of the 
OPC and allowed the organization to operate freely. 
Police reportedly harassed members of MASSOB, MOSOP, and other 
groups. On March 29, anti-riot police killed seven MASSOB members in 
Imo state after reportedly disrupting a MASSOB meeting. 
No action was taken against security forces who killed or injured 
persons while forcibly dispersing protests in 2002 or 2001, including 
the March 2002 raid on a weekly religious crusade in which the Enugu 
State Governor was implicated. 
The Constitution provides for the right to associate freely with 
other persons in political parties, trade unions, or special interest 
associations, and the Government generally respected this right in 
practice. Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that 
INEC used a stringent interpretation of constitutional requirements 
to block political parties from registering. The Constitution allows 
the free formation of political parties, and the number of parties 
registered with INEC increased to 31 in 2002. 
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and while the 
Federal Government generally respected religious freedom, there were 
some instances in which limits were placed on religious activity to 
address security and public safety concerns. Some state governments 
restricted these rights in practice in certain respects. 
The Constitution prohibits state and local governments from adopting 
an official religion; however, some Christians alleged that Islam had 
been adopted as the de facto state religion of several northern 
states that have reintroduced criminal law aspects of Shari'a and 
continued to use state resources to fund the construction of mosques, 
the teaching of Kadis (Muslim judges), and pilgrimages to Mecca 
(Hajj). However, government funds also were used by some states to 
pay for Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In general, states with a 
Christian or Muslim majority favored the majority faith. Both the 
federal and state governments were involved in religious matters, 
including the regulation of mandatory religious instruction in public 
schools, subsidized construction of churches and mosques, state-
sponsored participation in the Hajj, and pilgrimages to Jerusalem. 
Muslims in some predominately Christian states complained about 
religious discrimination. Approximately half of the population is 
Muslim, approximately 40 percent Christian, and roughly 10 percent 
practiced traditional indigenous religions or no religion. The 
Constitution provides that states may elect to use Islamic (Shari'a) 
customary law and courts, and some states interpreted this language 
as granting them the right to expand the jurisdiction of their 
existing Shari'a courts to include criminal matters (see Section 
1.e.). By year's end, 12 northern states had adopted variations of 
Shari'a-based criminal law--Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Kano, 
Katsina, Kaduna, Jigawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Borno, and Gombe. Adherence to 
Shari'a provisions was compulsory for Muslims in some states and 
optional in others and enforcement varied by locale. Adherence to 
Shari'a provisions was not compulsory for Christians in any of the 12 
states. 
Christian and Islamic groups planning to build new churches or 
mosques are required to register with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC). The CAC did not deny registration to any religious 
group during the year; however, some religious groups experienced 
delays in obtaining permission from local zoning boards to build 
houses of worship. Many nascent churches and Islamic congregations 
ignored the registration requirement, and a small number had their 
places of worship shut down because of enforcement of zoning laws. 
Some persons claimed that enforcement of these laws was selective. 
Christians in the predominantly Muslim northern states continued to 
allege that local government officials used zoning regulations to 
stop or slow the establishment of new churches. Officials responded 
that many of these new churches were being formed in residential 
neighborhoods not zoned for religious purposes. State officials said 
the certification boards were dealing with a large backlog of cases 
for all persons, regardless of religious faith. Muslims continued to 
complain that they were denied permission to build mosques in 
predominantly Christian southern states. The Government does not 
prohibit or discourage conversion from or to a particular religion, 
and unlike in the previous year, there were no reports that persons 
were arrested for conversion. There was no further action in the 2002 
case of two men brought to trial in Zamfara State for converting from 
Islam to Christianity by year's end. The law prohibits religious 
discrimination; however, reports were common that state and local 
government officials discriminated against persons practicing a 
religion different from their own, notably in hiring or awarding 
contracts, and private businesses frequently were guilty of informal 
religious and ethnic discrimination in their hiring practices and 
purchasing patterns. As religious differences often correspond with 
ethnic differences, discrimination at the local level is often a 
mixture of religious and ethnic biases. There was no update in the 
2002 case of 21 nurses fired for not wearing "Shari'a compliant 
dresses" in Bauchi State.
On February 19, members of a Muslim youth organization disrupted 
three secondary schools in Ibadan, protesting that girls were not 
wearing appropriate head coverings; several persons were injured. A 
similar invasion occurred the following week, and 51 persons were 
arrested and 39 arraigned on charges of public disturbance. All were 
released on bail, and no trial date had been set by year's end. 
Several northern state governments continued to ban public 
proselytizing during the year to avoid ethno-religious violence, 
although it is permitted by the Constitution. The Katsina and Plateau 
State governments maintained a ban on public proselytizing for 
security reasons during the year; however, some groups were allowed 
to carry out activities despite these formal bans, which generally 
were enforced on a case-by-case basis. Both Christian and Muslim 
organizations alleged that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Immigration Department restricted the entry into the country of 
certain religious practitioners, particularly persons suspected of 
intending to proselytize. According to the Constitution, students 
were not required to receive instruction relating to a religion other 
than their own; however, public school students in many parts of the 
country were subjected to mandatory Islamic or Christian religious 
instruction. State authorities claimed that students were permitted 
to decline to attend these classes or to request a teacher of their 
own religion to provide alternative instruction. However, there were 
no teachers of "Christian Religious Knowledge" in many northern 
schools, and there were reports that in Enugu and Edo States Muslim 
students could not access "Islamic Religious Knowledge" in the public 
schools. Although distribution of religious publications generally 
remained unrestricted, the Government periodically continued to 
enforce a ban on published religious advertisements. There were 
reports by Christians in Zamfara State that the state government 
restricted the distribution of Christian religious literature. 
Although expanded Shari'a laws technically do not apply to non-
Muslims, some non-Muslims, especially in Zamfara State, have been 
affected by certain social provisions of the laws, such as the 
separation of the sexes on public transportation. There also were 
reports that girls in government schools in Kano State were forced to 
wear the hijab. 
A number of states sanctioned private vigilante Shari'a enforcement 
groups known as Hisbah. Zamfara State vested the local vigilante 
group with full powers of arrest and prosecution because the state 
believed police were not enforcing the Shari'a laws. Jigawa State 
also mobilized a statewide Shari'a enforcement committee to arrest, 
detain, and prosecute Muslim offenders. Informal Shari'a enforcement 
groups may have been used for some law enforcement functions in other 
northern states as well. There were no further developments in the 
investigations into the violence in Kaduna regarding the Miss World 
Pageant in 2002.
Religious differences often corresponded to regional and ethnic 
differences. For example, the northern region was predominately 
Muslim. Many southern ethnic groups were predominantly Christian, 
although the Yoruba were approximately 50 percent Muslim. Both 
Muslims and Christians were found in large numbers in the Middle 
Belt. In many areas of the Middle Belt, Muslim Fulani tended to be 
herders, while the Muslim Hausa and most Christian ethnic groups 
tended more toward farming or urban living. It often was difficult to 
distinguish religious discrimination and tension from ethnic, 
regional, economic, and land use competition. Often religious 
tensions underscored what were predominantly ethnic and economic 
confrontations during the year (see Section 5). The Middle Belt 
experienced recurring ethno-religious violence during the year but 
overall violence decreased markedly from 2001 levels. 
Ethno-religious conflict continued in many parts of Plateau during 
the year. Repeated outbreaks of violence caused dozens of deaths and 
resulted in the destruction of places of worship, shops, and homes. 
Existing tensions between Christians and Muslims caused minor 
incidents, such as a traffic accident, to escalate into communal 
violence. For example, on June 9, in Numan, Adamawa State, a non-
local Muslim water hawker stabbed and killed a Christian woman in a 
disagreement over the price of water. The woman had refused to pay 
and the seller stabbed her in view of her family. The woman's family 
retaliated and over the next 2 days, eight persons were killed, one 
mosque and four churches were burned, numerous houses were destroyed, 
and hundreds of persons fled the town. 
In September, at Ahmadu Bello University in Kaduna State, a female 
Christian student was accused of blasphemy, which led to non-lethal 
clashes between Muslim and Christian students. 
There were no developments in the 2002 or 2001 incidents of 
interreligious violence. 
For a more detailed discussion, see the 2003 International Religious 
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation 
The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government 
generally respected them; however, police occasionally restricted 
freedom of movement by enforcing curfews in areas with ethno-
religious violence. 
In the months leading up to and during the elections, police in the 
Federal Capital Territory limited the number of Muslims entering 
Abuja to attend Friday Juma'at prayers at the National mosque because 
of the Government feared the gathering would become a spontaneous 
rally or riot in favor of opposition presidential candidate Buhari. 
Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Warri North, Warri South, and Warri 
Southwest experienced numerous curfews in response to inter-ethnic 
conflict during the year. Mobile police and military personnel manned 
checkpoints and restricted movement for 12 hours during the day, 
which reportedly calmed Warri town. Roadblocks and checkpoints 
routinely were used by law enforcement agencies to search for 
criminals and to prevent persons traveling from areas of conflict to 
other parts of the country where their presence might instigate 
retaliatory violence. There were no reports that government officials 
restricted mass movements of individuals fleeing ethnic unrest. 
Security and law enforcement officials continued to use excessive 
force at checkpoints and roadblocks and engage in extortion and 
violence (see Section 1.a.). 
The law provides that women are required to obtain permission from a 
male family member before having an application for a passport 
processed; however, this provision was not enforced strictly. Some 
men take their wives' and children's passports and other 
identification documents with them while traveling abroad to prevent 
their family from leaving the country. There were confirmed reports 
that persons were questioned upon entry or exit to the country at 
Murtala Mohammed International Airport in Lagos. These persons, some 
of whom are community or political activists or had been opponents of 
the Abacha regime, remained in immigration computer systems as 
individuals to be questioned by immigration or security officers. 
During the year, CDHR reported that Dr. Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, 
Chairperson of the International Government Council of the Centre for 
Democracy and Development (CDD), received his passport and an apology 
from police officials after being detained in 2002 trying to leave 
Murtala Mohammed Airport. 
During periods of ethno-religious violence, numerous persons were 
displaced from their places of residence (see Section 5). The Red 
Cross estimated in April that more than 57,000 citizens were 
displaced due to different ethno-religious clashes, including 11,000 
from a clash between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Adamawa State in 
March. The local Red Cross also accused the Government of not 
providing sufficient aid to those displaced in the fighting. 
In March, August, and September, tens of thousands of persons were 
displaced in the Niger Delta region in Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers 
States due to continued ethnic and communal conflict. 
No arrests were made after unknown gunmen assaulted displaced Tivs 
attempting to return to Taraba State in 2002. Unlike in the previous 
year, there were no reports that non-Tiv residents attached Tivs 
trying to return to their homes in Benue. Officials in Benue 
estimated that as many as 6,000 Tiv IDPs were unable to return to 
their homes in other states. Other observers estimated that fewer 
than 1,000 persons remained. 
The Lagos office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
estimated that 12,000 refugees, mostly ethnic Fulani herders, were in 
Cameroon at year's end. The refugees had fled eastern Benue and 
Taraba States following ethno-religious clashes between the Tiv and 
Jukun peoples in 2002. Approximately 5,000 Fulani returned during the 
year. No new Ogoni refugees arrived in Benin during the year, which 
has a population of approximately 235 Ogoni refugees. The UNHCR 
stated that there was "violence, insecurity, and a discrepancy in 
sharing resources, but it is not directed at the Ogoni", and it is 
safe for the Ogoni to return. 
The law provides for the granting of asylum and refugee status to 
persons who meet the definition in the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In practice, the 
Government provided protection against refoulement and granted 
refugee status or asylum. The Government cooperated with the UNHCR 
and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees through 
the NCR, its Federal Commissioner, and the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA). The Eligibility Committee (on which the 
UNHCR had observer status), which governed the granting of refugee 
status, asylum, and resettlement, and reviewed refugee and 
resettlement applications met in November. The Committee granted 
1,983 asylum seekers refugee status; 16 cases were rejected, with 
1,124 cases pending at year's end. 
There were an estimated 9,000 recognized refugees living in the 
country. At year's end, 400 refugees were repatriated from the 
country to Sierra Leone. Remaining refugees included others from 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The NCR reported that it provided education and health 
service programs to the refugees. The NCR reportedly also set up 
micro-credit programs for refugees in the areas of trading, poultry 
and fish farming, and cassava processing. 
The U.N. Commissioner for Refugees in the country announced on June 
24 that a refugee camp in Lagos State was holding 2,700 refugees from 
5 countries in facilities designed to hold 1,200. One problem 
resulting from the cramped conditions was an impending population 
explosion as large numbers of teenage girls were pregnant. 
The Government provided temporary protection during the year. In 
June, the Government agreed to resettle 5,000 Liberian refugees from 
the Nicla refugee camp in Cote d'Ivoire. Due to deteriorating 
conditions and voluntary departures at the Nicla camp, 3,000 Liberian 
refugees were resettled to Ogun state at year's end. 
To restore stability to Liberia, the Government provided asylum for 
Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, during the year. 
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
Change Their Government 
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully through periodic free and fair elections held 
on the basis of universal suffrage; however, citizens' right to 
change their government was abridged during National Assembly 
elections held on April 12 and presidential and gubernatorial 
elections held on April 19. State assembly elections were held on May 
3. Local elections were due to be held in 2002 but were postponed 
indefinitely again in June. 
Voter registration was carried out in 2002, and there were charges 
that millions of eligible voters were unable to register due to an 
apparent shortage of registration materials. In addition, there were 
allegations of improper hoarding of registration materials by 
politicians. A final voters list, required by law for the elections, 
was not published. In January police arrested three men allegedly 
planning to print 5 million fake voter registration cards prior to 
the presidential and parliamentary elections. 
Voters turned out for the legislative elections in much larger 
numbers than in 1999; however, widespread fraud marred the elections. 
The turnout was significantly less (under 50 percent) for the 
presidential and gubernatorial elections, which were also marred by 
widespread fraud. A total of 31 parties participated in the April 12 
National Assembly elections, and 19 parties had presidential 
candidates in the April 19 presidential election. The European Union 
observer mission categorized the presidential elections as extremely 
poor, stating that in the worst six states, elections effectively 
were not held, and in the rest of the country the elections were 
seriously marred. All major independent observer groups, 
international and domestic, had negative statements about the 
fairness of elections and cited problems throughout the country. 
Types of reported fraud included ballot stuffing, intentional 
miscounting, underage voting, multiple voting, intimidation, and 
violence, including political killings (see Section 1.a.). There were 
numerous attempts to kill members of political parties during the 
election year. There also were several cases of politically-motivated 
arrests (see Section 1.d.). All parties participated in the 
misconduct; observers cited violations by the ruling PDP 
significantly more than others. Some election tribunal cases to 
adjudicate disputed elections were still ongoing at year's end; 
however, more than 90 percent of the cases that had been decided were 
simply dismissed on technicalities. 
The President, Vice President, and other national and state officials 
serve 4-year terms, with limits of two elected terms per office. The 
next state and national elections are scheduled for 2007. 
Actions by the Government's INEC during the election year raised 
serious rule of law questions. In Federal Court of Appeals hearings 
on an election tribunal case brought by a losing presidential 
candidate, INEC argued that it could not provide the court with 
official documents--such as the National Register of Voters, 
candidate lists for the election and the vote tally sheets--which the 
court had subpoenaed. Some of those documents are required by law to 
be compiled before a general election and not providing those and the 
others to the court even months after the election also made it 
appear INEC was ignoring the subpoena. 
The Constitution outlaws the seizure of the Government by force and 
contains provisions for the removal of the President, Vice President, 
ministers, legislators, and state government officials for gross 
misconduct or medical reasons. Several public officials were 
scrutinized closely by the press and public and legislative 
investigators. In August 2002, the House of Representatives 
introduced a "resign or be impeached ultimatum" to President 
Obasanjo, but the effort eventually failed. Most of the opposition to 
the President came from legislators within his own party. In August 
and September, there was discussion of impeachment of the House 
Speaker, Bello Masari. In addition to the impeachment threat, public 
criticism of the President has been frequent and, at times, harsh. 
The President did not resort to force or intimidation to stifle the 
impeachment threat or the public criticism against him; however, more 
than half of the incumbent legislators of the President's party were 
not renominated for election. 
On July 10, Mobile Police detained Anambra State Governor Chris 
Ngige, forced his resignation, and held him for 5 hours. Ngige, a 
member of the ruling PDP, allegedly gave Chris Uba, his political 
godfather, a pre-signed an undated resignation letter. Uba, with the 
aid of the Deputy Governor Okey Udeh and others, attempted to 
forcibly remove Ngige from office. On August 7, a seven-member panel 
convened to investigate allegations of "gross misconduct" by Udeh 
under the state Constitution. On August 25, the Federal High Court 
ordered the panel to halt proceedings based on a motion filed by 
Udeh. The panel ignored the order and submitted its findings to the 
State House of Assembly. On September 9, the State House of Assembly 
voted to impeach Udeh. Udeh filed another suit with the Federal High 
Court claiming that his impeachment was unconstitutional. On 
September 16, the Anambra State High Court terminated the previous 
Federal High Court order ceasing impeachment proceedings. On 
September 20, the Federal Government agreed to abide by the terms of 
the order pending a ruling from a superior court. Legal proceedings 
were pending at year's end. 
The political system remained in transition. The three branches of 
the Government acted somewhat independently. The Senate and the House 
of Representatives acted on budget review and oversight, an election 
reform initiative, and resource allocation; however, legislative and 
executive ineffectiveness and inability to compromise resulted in 
little substantive legislation. There were continued calls for a 
national conference to reexamine the constitutional and political 
structure of the country. 
In 2001, the President signed an electoral law that extended the 
tenures of local governments by rescheduling local elections in 2003. 
State governors and state assemblies contested the provision as an 
infringement on the states' constitutional power to control local 
government. 
In 2002, the judiciary issued several important constitutional 
decisions that define federalism based on the rule of law, including 
that the National Assembly lacked the authority to extend the tenure 
of local governments and the decision that delimited the distribution 
of oil revenues. 
There are no legal impediments to political participation or voting 
by women. Men continued to dominate the political arena, and NGOs 
continued to protest the limited representation of women in the 
political process. Although there were more than 500 ministerial and 
National Assembly positions, there were only 3 female ministers, 3 
female senators, and 12 female representatives. The PDP waived the 
party filing fees for women seeking PDP nominations for various 
political offices to encourage more female candidates. 
There are no legal impediments to participation in government by 
members of any ethnic group. The Constitution mandates that the 
composition of the federal, state, and local governments and their 
agencies, as well as the conduct of their affairs, reflect the 
diverse character of the country to promote national unity and 
loyalty. This provision was designed as a safeguard against 
domination of the Government by persons from a few states or ethnic 
and sectional groups. The Government was an example of this 
diversity: President Obasanjo is a Yoruba from the southwest, the 
Vice President is a northerner, and the Senate President is an Igbo. 
The Government also attempted to balance other key positions among 
the different regions and ethnic groups. The Senate used its 
oversight role to reject many of President Obasanjo's ambassadorial 
appointments and insisted on three nominees from each state for each 
appointment. The political parties also engaged in "zoning," the 
practice of rotating positions within the party among the different 
regions and ethnic groups to ensure that each region was given 
adequate representation. Despite this effort, there were more than 
250 ethnic groups, and it was difficult to ensure representation of 
every group in the Government (see Section 5). Many groups complained 
of insufficient representation. Middle Belt and Christian officers 
dominated the military hierarchy. Some persons in the North believe 
that the northern Hausa were underrepresented in the military. 
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights 
A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally 
operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally 
were cooperative and responsive to their views. Criticism of the 
Government's past human rights' record was abundant in various media; 
however, during the year the Center for Law Enforcement Education 
(CLEEN) sued the Government in Federal Court over the seizure of more 
than 2,000 copies of the report "Hope Betrayed? A Report on Impunity 
and State-Sponsored Violence in Nigeria" in 2002, which the court 
recognized as a potential human rights violation. At year's end, the 
court had not heard the case. 
Human rights activists continued to complain that President Obasanjo 
and members of his Government did not meet with them as frequently as 
they did during the early years of his administration. 
The Catholic Secretariat continued to hold a monthly open forum in 
Lagos on various subjects relating to past and present human rights 
issues. Discussion panels included a number of NGOs, media, and 
religious leaders. Each session ended with recommendations to the 
Government on how best to resolve these issues. The Government had 
not responded to any of these recommendations by year's end. 
The NCR's report from it's 2002 fact-finding mission to assess Ogoni 
living conditions in Ogoniland was pending at year's end. 
The ICRC was active, with offices in Abuja and Lagos under the 
direction of a regional delegate. Its primary human rights activities 
during the year involved the training of prison officials on human 
rights, sanitation, and prisoner health (see Section 1.c.). 
The Commission of Inquiry into Communal Clashes in Benue, Nassarawa, 
Plateau, and Taraba States completed its investigation, but its 
report was not made public by year's end. A number of groups 
continued to call for a full investigation into the 2001 killings of 
civilians in Benue by soldiers. 
The NHRC, which was tasked with monitoring and protecting human 
rights in the country, enjoyed greater recognition by and 
coordination with NGOs, and worked to establish its credibility as an 
independent monitoring body. The NHRC was chaired by retired Justice 
Uche Omo, included 15 other members, and had zonal affiliates in each 
of the country's six political regions. Since its inception, the NHRC 
has been denied adequate funding to do its job properly. The NHRC 
created a strategic work plan for the year and inaugurated steering 
and coordinating committees for the national action plan to be 
deposited with the UNCHR in December 2002. 
During the U.N. Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR) in March and 
April, the NHRC was selected to become a member of International 
Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions (ICC). 
The HRVIC, commonly known as the Oputa panel, was a one-time 
commission to investigate human rights abuses from 1966 to 1999, 
presented its findings to the President in 2002 and recommended 
compensation for victims of the worst human rights abuses; no one was 
compensated by year's end. 
In 2002, Minister of Information and National Orientation, Professor 
Jerry Gana, reported that the Government would wait for all pending 
lawsuits, including one filed in 2002 by former Head of State Ibrahim 
Babangida that sought to ban the implementation of the panels' 
findings, to be decided before determining whether to publish the 
panel's recommendations. 
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, 
Language, or Social Status 
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on community, place 
of origin, ethnic group, sex, religion, or political opinion. 
However, customary and religious discrimination against women 
persisted, social discrimination on the basis of both religion and 
ethnicity remained widespread, and ethnic and regional tensions 
continued to contribute to serious violence both between citizens and 
the security forces and between groups of citizens. 
Women 
Domestic violence was a problem. Reports of spousal abuse were 
common, especially those of wife beating. Police normally did not 
intervene in domestic disputes, which seldom were discussed publicly. 
The Penal Code permits husbands to use physical means to chastise 
their wives as long as it does not result in "grievous harm," which 
is defined as loss of sight, hearing, power of speech, facial 
disfigurement, or other life threatening injuries. A women's rights 
group estimated that spousal abuse occurred in 20 percent of adult 
relationships. In more traditional areas of the country, courts and 
police were reluctant to intervene to protect women who accused their 
husbands formally if the level of alleged abuse did not exceed 
customary norms in the areas. Rape and sexual harassment continued to 
be problems. 
Studies conducted by the U.N. development systems and the World 
Health Organization estimated the FGM rate at approximately 60 
percent among the nation's female population. While practiced in all 
parts of the country, FGM was more predominant in the southern and 
eastern zones, and local experts estimated the prevalence may be as 
high as 100 percent in some ethnic enclaves in the south. Women from 
northern states were less likely to undergo FGM; however, those 
affected were more likely to undergo the severe type of FGM known as 
infibulation. The age at which women and girls were subjected to the 
practice varied from the first week of life until after a woman 
delivers her first child. Women's Center for Peace and Development 
(WOPED) believed that the practice was perpetuated because of a 
cultural belief that uncircumcised women were promiscuous, unclean, 
unsuitable for marriage, physically undesirable, and were potential 
health risks to themselves and their children, especially during 
childbirth. 
The Federal Government publicly opposed FGM; however, it took no 
legal action to curb the practice. There were no federal laws banning 
FGM. Because of the considerable problems that anti-FGM groups faced 
at the federal level, most refocused their energies to combat FGM at 
the state and local government area (LGA) level. Bayelsa, Edo, Ogun, 
Cross River, Osun, and Rivers States have banned FGM. However, once a 
state legislature criminalized FGM, NGOs found that they had to 
convince the LGA authorities that state laws were applicable in their 
districts. The Ministry of Health, women's groups, and many NGOs 
sponsored public awareness projects to educate communities about the 
health hazards of FGM. They worked to eradicate the practice; 
however, they had limited contact with health care workers on the 
medical effects of FGM.
Prostitution was a serious social problem, particularly in urban 
areas. A number of states enforced existing laws or introduced laws 
to combat prostitution. All states that have adopted Shari'a have 
criminalized prostitution, and this ban was enforced with varying 
degrees of success. Prostitution was not illegal in Lagos State; 
however, authorities used statutes that outlaw pandering as a 
justification to arrest prostitutes. 
There was an active market for trafficking in women (see Section 
6.f.). 
In some parts of the country, women continued to be harassed for 
social and religious reasons. Purdah continued in parts of the far 
north (see Section 1.f.). 
Women also experienced considerable discrimination. There are no laws 
barring women from particular fields of employment; however, women 
often experienced discrimination because the Government tolerated 
customary and religious practices that adversely affected them. The 
Nigerian NGOs Coalition expressed concern about continued 
discrimination against women in the private sector, particularly in 
access to employment, promotion to higher professional positions, and 
in salary inequality. There were credible reports that several 
businesses operated with a "get pregnant, get fired" policy. Women 
remained underrepresented in the formal sector but played an active 
and vital role in the country's informal economy. While the number of 
women employed in the business sector increased every year, women did 
not receive equal pay for equal work and often found it extremely 
difficult to acquire commercial credit or to obtain tax deductions or 
rebates as heads of households. Unmarried women in particular endured 
many forms of discrimination. 
While some women made considerable individual progress both in the 
academic and business world, women remained underprivileged. Although 
women were not barred legally from owning land, under some customary 
land tenure systems only men could own land, and women could gain 
access to land only through marriage or family. In addition, many 
customary practices did not recognize a woman's right to inherit her 
husband's property, and many widows were rendered destitute when 
their in-laws took virtually all of the deceased husband's property. 
Widows were subjected to unfavorable conditions as a result of 
discriminatory traditional customs and economic 
deprivation. "Confinement" was the most common rite of deprivation to 
which widows were subjected, and it occurred predominately in the 
East. Confined widows were under restrictions for as long as 1 year 
and usually were required to shave their heads and dress in black. In 
other areas, a widow was considered a part of her husband's property, 
to be "inherited" by his family. Shari'a personal law protects 
widows' property rights. An NGO reported that several any women have 
succeeded in protecting their right in Shari'a courts. Polygyny 
continued to be practiced widely among many ethnic and religious 
groups. Women were required by law to obtain permission from a male 
family member to get a passport (see Section 2.d.). 
Women were affected to varying degrees by the adoption of various 
forms of Shari'a law in 12 northern states. In Zamfara State, local 
governments instituted laws requiring the separation of Muslim men 
and women in transportation and health care. In practice, the 
testimony of women was not given the same weight as that of men in 
many criminal courts (see Section 1.e.). 
Children 
While the Government increased spending on children's health in 
previous years, it seldom enforced even the inadequate laws designed 
to protect the rights of children. Public schools continued to be 
inadequate, and limited facilities precluded access to education for 
many children. The Constitution calls for the Government, "when 
practical," to provide free, compulsory, and universal primary 
education; however, compulsory primary education rarely was provided. 
In many parts of the country, girls were discriminated against in 
access to education for social and economic reasons. When economic 
hardship restricted many families' ability to send girls to school, 
many girls were directed into activities such as domestic work, 
trading, and street vending. The literacy rate for men was 72 percent 
but only 56 percent for women. Rural girls were even more 
disadvantaged than their urban counterparts--only 42 percent of rural 
girls were enrolled in school compared with 72 percent of urban 
girls. Many families favored boys over girls in deciding which 
children to enroll in secondary and elementary schools. 
While most schools in the north traditionally have separated children 
by gender, it was required by law in Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kebbi State 
schools (see Section 2.c.). 
Cases of child abuse, abandoned infants, child prostitution, and 
physically harmful child labor practices remained common throughout 
the country (see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). The Government criticized 
child abuse and neglect but did not undertake any significant 
measures to stop customary practices harmful to children, such as the 
sale of young girls into marriage. There were credible reports that 
poor families sold their daughters into marriage as a means to 
supplement their incomes. Young girls sometimes were forced into 
marriage as soon as they reached puberty, regardless of age, to 
prevent the "indecency" associated with premarital sex. Human rights 
groups reported an increase in sexual assaults and rapes of young 
girls, especially in the North, and attributed the increase to a fear 
of AIDS and a resulting desire for young virgins. 
FGM was commonly performed on girls (see Section 5, Women). 
Persons with Disabilities 
While the Government called for private business to institute 
policies that ensured fair treatment for persons with disabilities, 
it did not enact any laws during the year requiring greater 
accessibility to buildings or public transportation, nor did it 
formulate any policy specifically ensuring the right of persons with 
disabilities to work. The Government ran vocational training centers 
in Abuja to provide training to beggars with disabilities. 
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities 
The country's population was ethnically diverse, and consisted of 
more than 250 groups, many of which spoke distinct primary languages 
and were concentrated geographically. There was no majority ethnic 
group. The four largest ethnic groups, which comprised two-thirds of 
the country's population, were the Hausa and Fulani of the north, the 
Yoruba of the southwest, and the Igbos of the southeast. The Ijaw of 
the South Delta were the fifth largest group, followed by Kanuri in 
the far northeast, and the Tiv in the Middle Belt. 
The Constitution prohibits ethnic discrimination by the Government. 
Nonetheless, claims of marginalization, particularly by members of 
southern minority groups and Igbos, continued; in particular, the 
ethnic groups of the Niger Delta continued their calls for high-level 
representation on petroleum issues and within the security forces. 
Northern Muslims accused the Government of favoring Yorubas or 
Christians from the Middle Belt for those positions. Traditional 
linkages continued to impose considerable pressure on individual 
government officials to favor their own ethnic groups for important 
positions and patronage. 
Societal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity was practiced 
widely by members of all ethnic groups and was evident in private 
sector hiring patterns, de facto ethnic segregation of urban 
neighborhoods, and a continuing paucity of marriages across major 
ethnic and regional lines. There was a long history of tension among 
some ethnic groups (see Section 2.c.).
Ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Akwa 
Ibom States, have claimed environmental degradation and government 
indifference to their status in the Delta despite the fact that most 
of oil wealth comes from the Niger Delta region. Groups such as the 
Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, and Ogoni continued to express their 
unhappiness about their perceived economic exploitation and the 
environmental destruction of their homelands, and incidents of ethnic 
conflict and confrontation with government officials and forces 
continued in the Delta area (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). Other 
ethnic groups saw the Kaiama Declaration by Ijaws, which claimed the 
entire Delta to be the property of the Ijaw, as threatening their 
rights. Disparate organizations of armed youths from a variety of 
ethnic groups continued to take oil company personnel hostage in the 
Delta Region (see Section 1.b.). Many oil companies continued to rely 
on local police and, in some cases, military troops to protect their 
facilities and personnel. The oil companies usually financially 
supported these security forces. Local youths claimed that the 
security personnel engaged in unlawful killings and other human 
rights abuses (see Section 1.a.). 
Tensions flared in March with attacks on oil production facilities 
near Escravos, Delta State, and kidnappings of oil company personnel 
by Ijaw youths. The practice of bunkering, the diversion of oil 
production to the black market by all parties in the conflict, 
occurred frequently. Approximately 15 percent of the country's total 
yearly production was shutdown as a result of the violence initiated 
by Ijaw youths. Inter-ethnic fighting also displaced tens of 
thousands of local inhabitants. Violence ended in the region in 
April; however, hostilities renewed in August and continued at year's 
end. 
On March 14, Ijaw militants involved in the theft of oil from 
pipelines and based in the Delta State community of Okenrenkoko 
clashed with military personnel. The military claimed it was 
responding to an armed threat from criminals; Ijaw communities 
accused the military of provoking hostilities through a premeditated 
attack. The violence led to the death of several soldiers, at least 
10 Ijaw militants, and possibly some Ijaw civilians. Ijaw communities 
claimed that the military attacked Okenrenkoko, destroyed several 
homes and killing several villagers. 
On April 11, approximately 200 Ijaw militants in speedboats raided 
the Itsekiri town of Koko, Delta state and reportedly killed 50 
persons. The Ijaw militants destroyed more than 55 buildings, 
including the Koko Local Government building. 
On August 13, fighting broke out in Warri town between rival Ijaw and 
Itsekiri militants. The local Red Cross reported that military 
efforts to quell the fighting, which lasted more than 7 days, 
resulted more than 100 deaths, civilian and combatant. The Government 
had not restored order in the region by year's end. 
Competing economic aspirations among smaller ethnic groups related to 
the control of state and local governments led to violent conflicts 
during the year. 
Conflict over land rights and ownership continued among members of 
the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, and Azara ethnic groups; each of these groups 
resided at or near the convergence of Nassarawa, Benue, and Taraba 
States. The Tiv, who were thought to have migrated to the country 
later than other inhabitants of the disputed area, were regarded as 
interlopers by the "indigenous" ethnic groups despite the fact that 
they predominate in much of Benue and parts of other states. 
Violence between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Adamawa State lasted 
for 2 weeks in March, resulting in as many as 110 deaths, and 21,000 
displaced from their homes. 
Communal violence between members of the Ogori and Ekpedo ethnic 
groups in Kogi and Edo states began over boundary and land disputes. 
On July 2, Ogori youths from Kogi reportedly attacked Ekpedo villages 
near Agenebode, Edo, burning 99 houses. On July 20, Ekpedo youths 
killed and mutilated an Ogori community leader visiting an Ekpedo 
village to discuss the dispute in retaliation. Kogi and Edo state 
governors declared the disputed land a "buffer zone," and the matter 
has been referred to the National Boundary Commission. 
Communal violence occurred in Plateau State, resulting in more than 
80 deaths during the year as local communities continued to compete 
for scarce resources. The State Government reported that criminals 
and hired mercenaries from other areas of the country, Chad, and 
Niger added to the violence after being hired and induced by some 
communities to attack rival villages in the state. For example, 65 
persons were killed in April, a village chief was killed by bandits 
in May, and 3 persons were killed in June and 15 more in July. 
The violent border dispute in the east between Cross River and Akwa 
Ibom States flared during the year. Communal violence abated between 
Jukun-Kuteb (Taraba State). Ife-Modakeke, Osun state experienced 
renewed communal violence, but was diminished in nature compared with 
previous incidents. 
There were no developments in previous years' incidents of ethno-
religious violence. 
Section 6 Worker Rights 
a. The Right of Association 
The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to form or 
belong to any trade union or other association for the protection of 
their interests, and workers exercised this right in practice; 
however, several statutory restrictions on the right of association 
and on trade unions remained in effect. 
According to figures provided by the National Labor Congress (NLC), 
total union membership was approximately 4 million. Less that 10 
percent of the total work force was organized. With the exception of 
small number of workers engaged in commercial food procession, the 
agricultural sector, which employed the majority of the work force, 
was not organized. The informal sector, and small and medium 
enterprises, remained largely unorganized. 
The Government has mandated a single-labor-federation structure for 
workers, with service and industrial unions grouped under it. The NLC 
was the only central labor federation permitted by law. Trade unions 
are required to be registered formally by the Government and a 
minimum 50 workers are required to form a trade union; only 29 trade 
unions had been formally recognized by the Government at year's end. 
The labor movement was composed of both junior and senior staff 
workers; however, nonmanagement senior staff members were barred from 
joining the trade unions while junior staff workers, primarily the 
blue-collar workers, were organized into the 29 industrial and 
service unions that were affiliated with the NLC. 
The senior staff workers were organized into 21 associations that 
comprised the Trade Union Congress (TUC), which claimed a membership 
of approximately 400,000 to 600,000. The TUC, which was composed 
primarily of white-collar workers, was not officially sanctioned by 
the Government and was prohibited by statute from affiliation with 
the NLC; it was also denied a seat on the National Labor Advisory 
Council (NLAC). These legal restrictions diluted the bargaining 
strength of workers. The ILO Committee of Experts has repeatedly 
cited these and other restrictions, including: requiring all 
registered labor unions to affiliate with a single central labor 
federation (the NLC); establishing a minimum of 50 workers to form a 
trade union; providing for the possibility of compulsory arbitration; 
giving the registrar broad powers to supervise trade union accounts; 
and giving the Government discretionary power to revoke the 
certification of a trade union due to overriding public interests. 
Several labor associations disassociated themselves with the TUC 
following complaints that the TUC had misled its constituents during 
the gasoline price strike in June. At least 8 of the TUC's 29 
associations left it to form the Congress of Free Trade Unions 
(CFTU). 
Workers, except members of the armed forces and employees designated 
as essential by the Government, may join trade unions. Essential 
workers included government employees in the police, customs, 
immigration, prisons, federal mint, central bank, and the 
telecommunications sector. Employees working in designated export 
procession zone (EPZ) may not join a union until 10 years after the 
start-up of the enterprise (see Section 6.b.). 
The Maritime Workers Union was active at year's end. 
The Constitution prohibits anti-union discrimination, and there were 
no reports of such practice. Complaints of anti-union discrimination 
could be brought to the Ministry of Labor for mediation, 
conciliation, and resolution. 
The NLC and labor unions were free to affiliate with international 
bodies; however, prior approval from the Minister was required. The 
NLC had affiliated with the Organization of African Trade Unions and 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 
The labor laws provide for both the right to organize and bargain 
collectively between management and trade unions, and collective 
bargaining occurred throughout the public sector and the organized 
private sector. The Labor Minister could refer unresolved disputes to 
the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and the National Industrial 
Court (NIC). Union officials questioned the effectiveness of the NIC 
in view of its inability to resolve various disputes stemming from 
the Government's failure to fulfill contract provisions for public 
sector employees. Union leaders criticized the arbitration system's 
dependence on the Labor Minister's referrals. The Labor Minister made 
several referrals to the IAP during the year. The IAP and NIC were 
active; however, both suffered from a lack of resources. 
Workers had the right to strike; however, certain essential workers 
were required to provide advance notice of a strike. A worker under a 
collective bargaining agreement could not participate in a strike 
unless his union complied with the requirements of the law, which 
included provisions for mandatory mediation and for referral of the 
dispute to the Government. The law allows the Government discretion 
to refer the matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration panel, board 
of inquiry, or the NIC. However, in practice the law does not appear 
to be enforced; strikes, including in the public sector, were 
widespread. 
In January, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) commenced 
a 6-month strike to protest, among other things, the nonpayment of 
research allowances and the nonimplementation of an agreement reached 
in 2001 to re-admit 49 dismissed lecturers of the University of 
Ilorin who had previously participated in a strike. ASUU suspended 
the strike on June 18 following the intervention of the IAP. 
On March 31, the NLC directed all public sector employees to commence 
a 3-day warning strike to protest federal government refusal to pay 
an agreed upon 12.5 percent salary increase (see Section 6.e.). The 
strike followed the expiration of a 2-week ultimatum. Organizers 
called off the strike on April 1 after the Government agreed to 
prepare a supplementary budget the National Assembly to accommodate 
salary increases. 
On June 30, NLC, joined by senior staff associations under the 
umbrella of the TUC, commenced a nationwide strike action to protest 
increases in gas prices. In the 10-day national strike, there were 18 
confirmed killings of protestors by security forces. Security forces 
forcibly dispersed several demonstrations, arrested union leaders, 
and brutalized a journalist in Abuja. The strike was suspended 
following an agreement reached between government and labor leaders. 
During the year, the Medical and Health Workers Union went on strike 
for 3 days regarding salary increases and payments of other 
allowances. They reached an agreement with the Ministry of Health, 
resolving the issue. 
The Anambra State Government reached an agreement with public sector 
unions on the modalities for the payment of outstanding arrears 
during the year. The Government paid several months arrears; however, 
salaries were in arrears again at year's end. The state civil service 
was nearly paralyzed as many workers declined to work until salary 
arrears were paid. 
During the year, smaller strikes continued in the oil sector, 
particularly in the Niger Delta. The National Union of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and its senior staff counterpart 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria 
(PENGASSAN) were particularly concerned about the increasing use of 
contract labor and the number of indigenous workers in management 
positions. On February 15, NUPENG and PENGASSAN branch units in 
Chevron and Shell staged warning strikes that lasted 5 days to 
protest an alleged plan to severely cut jobs and replace indigenous 
employees with third country nationals. 
There were no developments in the following 2002 strikes: the January 
general strike protesting the Government's 15.3 percent fuel price 
hike; the February police strike demanding payment of 1-year's wage 
arrears; the May strike by the Nigerian Union of Railwaymen (NUR) 
over the nonpayment of 3 months' salary; and the July strike by the 
Lagos State Truck Owners Association, Port Harcourt dockworkers, and 
Shell (SPDC) contract workers. 
There were no laws prohibiting retribution against strikers and 
strike leaders, but strikers who believed they were victims of unfair 
retribution could submit their cases to IAP, with the approval of the 
Labor Ministry. The IAP's decisions were binding on parties but could 
be appealed to the NIC. In practice the decisions of these bodies 
infrequently carried the force of law. Union representatives 
described the arbitration process as cumbersome and time-consuming, 
and an ineffective deterrent to retribution against strikers. 
On October 3, the Inspector-General of Police in Abuja called 
President of the NLC Adams Oshiomhole in for questioning following a 
3-hour meeting in Lagos on how to mobilize against higher fuel 
prices. Later in the month, as the fuel price crisis deepened, six 
leaders of the NLC were arrested as they picketed filling stations 
selling gasoline at above the official price. The leaders were 
detained and refused bail for 1 week. 
The Government retained broad legal authority over labor matters and 
often intervened in disputes seen to challenge key political or 
economic objectives. However, during the year, the NLC increasingly 
spoke out on economic reform, fuel price deregulation, privatization, 
globalization, tariffs, corruption, contract workers, and political 
issues. 
EPZs in Calabar, Cross River State, and Onne Port, Rivers State, 
operated during the year. Workers and employers in these zones were 
subject to national labor laws, which provided for a 10-year amnesty 
on trade unions, strikes, or lockouts following the commencement of 
operations within a zone. In addition, the law allows the EPZ 
Authority to handle the resolution of disputes between employers and 
employees instead of workers' organizations or unions. The ILO has 
criticized the EPZ Decree for not allowing any unauthorized person to 
enter any EPZ consequently making it very difficult for workers to 
form or join trade unions since union representatives are not allowed 
access. 
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor 
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor; however, there were reports 
that it occurred (see Section 6.f.), and enforcement of the law was 
not effective. 
The Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor 
by children; however, the prohibition on forced labor extends to 
children. There were reports such practices occurred (see Section 5 
and 6.d.). 
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment 
Child labor remained a problem. The law prohibits employment of 
children less than 15 years of age in commerce and industry and 
restricts other child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic 
work. The law states that children may not be employed in 
agricultural or domestic work for more than 8 hours per day. The 
Decree allows the apprenticeship of youths at the age of 13 under 
specific conditions. 
Economic hardship resulted in high numbers of children in commercial 
activities aimed at enhancing meager family income. The ILO estimated 
that approximately 12 million children between the ages of 10 and 14 
(25 percent of all children) were employed in some capacity. Children 
frequently were employed as beggars, hawkers, and bus conductors in 
urban areas. The use of children as domestic servants was common. 
There were reports of forced child labor (see Section 6.f.). There 
were occasional reports of forced child labor, including child 
slavery rings operating between Nigeria and neighboring countries. 
The Labor Ministry had an inspections department whose major 
responsibilities included enforcement of legal provisions relating to 
conditions of work and protection of workers. However, there were 
fewer than 50 inspectors for the entire country, and the Ministry 
conducted inspections only in the formal business sector, in which 
the incidence of child labor was not significant. 
Private and government initiatives to stem the growing incidence of 
child employment continued but were ineffective. UNICEF operated 
programs that removed young girls from the street hawking trade and 
relocated them to informal educational settings. UNICEF reported that 
the program had minimal success. In conjunction with the ILO, the 
Government formulated a national program of action in support of 
child rights, survival, protection, development, and participation; 
however, the program did not show any results by year's end due to 
logistical problems and changing personnel in the Ministry. A child 
rights bill was passed by the legislature during the year; however, 
there were no noticeable changes by year's end. ILO statistics 
indicated that the incidence of child labor is still on the increase, 
in spite of programs designed to reduce it. 
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work 
The law sets a minimum wage, which was reviewed infrequently. Real 
private sector wages greatly exceeded the minimum wage. The minimum 
wage was $56.70 (7,500 naira) per month (with a 13 month year as the 
law mandates an extra month's pay for the Christmas holiday). Ghost 
workers (who appeared on the employment rolls but not on the job) 
remained a significant problem that was not addressed fully during 
the year. The Government directed each State administration to 
establish its own salary structure based on its ability to pay and in 
accord with the national minimum wage; however, in August, the 
Government and the NLC signed an agreement to increase the public 
sector wage by up to 12.5 percent for junior grades, representing 
half of the 25 percent earlier agreed upon. Many state governments 
have stated they are not in a position to pay the increase without 
massive layoffs or the elimination of ghost workers. The issue of the 
minimum wage caused several labor disruptions throughout the year, 
and remained unresolved in several states (see Section 6.b.). 
In September, the Government announced an agreement to implement 
sliding scale wage increases for all federal civil servants 
retroactive to July 1, under which the lowest paid workers would 
receive the 12.5 percent increase while those at the top would get 4 
percent; however, this increase had not been paid by year's end. 
The law forbids any employer from granting a general wage increase to 
its workers without prior government approval; however, in practice 
private sector wage increases generally were not submitted to the 
Government for prior approval. 
The law mandates a 40-hour workweek, 2 to 4 weeks annual leave, and 
overtime and holiday pay, except for agricultural and domestic 
workers. There is no law prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime. 
The law also establishes general health and safety provisions, some 
of which were aimed specifically at young or female workers. It 
requires that the factory division of the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment inspect factories for compliance with health and safety 
standards; however, this agency was greatly underfunded, lacked basic 
resources and training, and consequently neglected safety oversight 
of many enterprises, particularly construction sites and other 
nonfactory work. The Ministry often failed to reimburse inspectors 
for expenses incurred in traveling to inspection sites, and safety 
oversight of many enterprises often were neglected. The law requires 
employers to compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of 
those killed in industrial accidents. The Labor Ministry, which was 
charged with enforcement of these laws, has been ineffective in 
identifying violators. The Government has failed to act on various 
ILO recommendations to update its program on inspection and accident 
reporting. The Labor Decree did not provide workers with the right to 
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of 
employment. 
The law applies to legal foreign workers; however, in practice, not 
all multinational companies respected these laws in practice. 
f. Trafficking in Persons 
On July 14, President Obasanjo signed a bill into law prohibiting 
human trafficking; however, trafficking in persons remained a 
problem. The country was an origin, transit, and destination country 
for trafficked persons, with an active, growing market for 
trafficking in women and children within the region and to Europe. 
The July law also created the National Agency for Prohibition of 
Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), which was active at year's end. 
President Obasanjo selected a Special Assistant for Human Trafficking 
and Child Labor in June. 
The National police have an anti-trafficking unit, and official anti-
trafficking units have been created in all 11 states. Immigration has 
anti-trafficking units as well. Many states that arrest traffickers 
were forced to release them when victims and their families refused 
to testify. The Government prosecuted only a few persons for 
trafficking during the year. 
On September 28, immigration officers arrested 6 suspects in a child 
trafficking syndicate and repatriated 116 Beninois boys. The boys, 
aged 5 to 17 years, had been trafficked to work in a quarry in Ogun 
State. The U.N. reported that the boys' families were promised annual 
fees of $36.42 and other gifts in return for their labor. Once in the 
country, the boys suffered poor working conditions, were inadequately 
fed, and given salaries of $1.56 per month. Some of the boys had been 
held against their will for up to 5 years. The traffickers were 
awaiting trial at year's end. Approximately 380 children were 
repatriated to Benin during the year. 
There were no developments in the 2002 cases against a high chief who 
since has been stripped of his title, the trafficker arrested for 
trafficking 10 teenage girls, the 30 trafficking cases pending in Edo 
State; or the reported 2001 cases of trafficking. 
The full nature and scope of the trade remained unknown, but 
immigration and police officials throughout Europe continued to 
report a steady flow of Nigerian women lured and sold into 
prostitution in Europe, particularly Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain. In September, 562 trafficking victims had been deported to the 
country since the beginning of the year; over the past 3 years, 1,660 
persons were returned to the country from Europe and North America. 
Nigerian Interpol claimed that some women entered the sex trade 
independently, were not controlled by syndicates, and were 
economically motivated. Numerous human rights organizations claimed a 
majority of women entered the sex trade independently, were 
controlled by syndicates, were economically motivated, and were 
culturally pressured to do so to provide for families back home. 
These groups further claimed that the sex trade was inculcated into 
the culture and was an acceptable social practice for many young 
women; although, most women were unaware of the conditions in which 
they would be placed. However, several women's rights organizations 
reported that hundreds of women migrated to Europe in response to job 
offers as domestic workers or waitresses. Upon arrival, many were 
forced into prostitution to pay off debts. In addition, there was 
evidence that crime syndicates may use indebtedness, secret rituals, 
threats of beatings and rape, physical injury to the victim's family, 
arrest, and deportation to persuade those forced into and practicing 
sex work from attempting to escape or from contacting police and NGOs 
for assistance. 
Nigerian girls are also reported to be trafficked to the United 
Kingdom as sex workers; however, the trade to the United Kingdom was 
reportedly less than that to other European countries. 
Incidents of child trafficking in Lagos and other major cities during 
the year were suspected to be commonplace. Unlike in the previous 
year, there were no confirmed reports of smuggling children to the 
U.S. during the year. Child traffickers received a monthly payment 
from the employer, part of which was to be remitted to the parents of 
the indentured child servant. Traffickers took advantage of a 
cultural tradition of "fostering," under which it was acceptable to 
send a child to live and work with a more prosperous family in an 
urban center in return for educational and vocational advancement. 
Often the children in these situations only worked and did not 
receive any formal education; however, many families who employed 
children as domestic servants also paid their school fees. Other 
children were forced to serve as domestics or to become street 
hawkers selling nuts, fruits, or other items. There were credible 
reports that poor families sold their daughters into marriage as a 
means of supplementing their income (see Section 5). 
According to ILO reports, there was an active and extensive trade in 
child laborers. Some were trafficked to Cameroon, Gabon, Benin, and 
Equatorial Guinea to work in agricultural enterprises. Other children 
were coerced into prostitution (see Section 5). Authorities also have 
identified a trade route for traffickers of children for labor 
through Katsina and Sokoto to the Middle East and East Africa. The 
eastern part of the country and some southern states such as Cross 
Rivers and Akwa Ibom were the points of trafficking of children for 
labor and, in some cases, human sacrifice. The country remained a 
destination for the trafficking of Togolese children. 
Children from neighboring countries also were trafficked to the 
country for work as domestic servants. 
The Government has conducted few investigations into the involvement 
of government officials in trafficking; however, allegations of such 
involvement reportedly were widespread. Some returnees have alleged 
that immigration officials actively connived with syndicates. In 
2002, the Assistant Inspector General of Police investigated 
allegations of the collusion of customs officials in trafficking; 
however, there were no reports and investigation continued during the 
year. In 2002, the Government announced it was investigating a former 
customs officer and two others suspected of trafficking children in 
Abuja. 
The Government provided support to international NGOs, which protect 
victims. Nigerian embassies in destination countries provided 
assistance to victims, and the Foreign Ministry created a position to 
facilitate victim repatriation. Regional centers to monitor child 
rights violations have been established. 
There was federal and state government acknowledgement of 
trafficking, and prevention efforts were underway at all levels. 
Awareness campaigns, undertaken by NGOs, the U.N., prominent 
politicians, state governments, and members of the press continued to 
gain widespread attention. The issue of trafficking in persons for 
commercial sexual exploitation to Europe initially raised the 
awareness of trafficking, and the awareness of child trafficking for 
forced labor was growing. For example, Imo State continued to promote 
a comprehensive anti-trafficking campaign. 
Police attempts to stem the trafficking of persons were inadequate, 
and frequently the victims of trafficking were subjected to lengthy 
detention and public humiliation upon repatriation.
Uchennna Okonkwor